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3ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper  is to review the range of social policies that have been adopted by the
government of Croatia since independence together with those that have been retained from the
socialist past and  to ask whether it might be possible to improve them.  The paper  concentrates on
issues of social security and employment. After the Introduction, in  Section 2 we provide estimates
of the level and composition of social expenditure in Croatia in the last two or three years.  These
show that the scale of public expenditure has been growing and that it is high compared with a
number of other transition economies.  This is also true of social expenditure within the overall
budget.  It is this development that has, in fact, prompted the present report.  Section 3 focuses upon
the labour market. It assesses evidence on participation and on the level of unemployment.  It also
examines evidence on inequality and poverty.  Finally, it looks at the unemployment benefit to see
how far it provides an adequate safety-net for those who lose their jobs. Section 4 concentrates on the
structure of social welfare and social assistance programmes provided by the Croatian  government.
Finally, Section 5 examines possible ways in which the efficacy of the present system might be
improved.
4WELFARE POLICY AND SOCIAL TRANSFERS
IN CROATIA
1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper  is to review the range of social policies that have been adopted by the
government of Croatia since independence together with those that have been retained from the
socialist past and  to ask whether it might be possible to improve them.1 The report concentrates on
issues of social security and employment since other specialists commissioned by the World Bank
are considering the questions of pension reform and the reform of health insurance.
The government of Croatia faces a wider range of social challenges than those of most  other post-
socialist states.  In common with most of Eastern Europe, it has to cope with the consequences of
the so-called transition recession, with economic restructuring  and privatisation.  In addition, it has
to complete the process of state-building since it was a part of the Yugoslav Federation until 1992
and it has had to cope with the consequences of the war with Serbia.  These include the repair of
war damage and the resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.  Finally, in the wake of the
Dayton Accords and the return of previously occupied territory, it has had to return its armed forces
to a peacetime footing and reintegrate its war veterans into civil society.  These additional tasks
have placed an added burden on the social welfare institutions at various levels.  At the same time
they make it all the more important that available resources are used efficiently if the government is
to make sufficient space for   economic growth upon which the long-term solution of these social
problems depends.
The analysis of social policy in Croatia is hindered by the lack of certain statistics and by
inconsistencies in some of what is published.  The most important lacuna for the purposes of this
report is the absence of a Family Budget Survey (FBS)—which has not been carried out since 1987.
This gap should, however, soon be filled:  a decision has been taken to conduct such a survey and
the first results from it are promised for the end of 1998. Second, the absence of an FBS makes it
more difficult to calculate a cost of living index for particular population groups;  as a result,
indexes of real wages tend to be calculated using the retail price index.  Third, there are substantial
divergences between estimates of employment and unemployment derived from the Labour Force
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5Survey (which attempts to employ a methodology consistent with that recommended by the ILO)
and those which are generated by the Employment Service—that is by registration data.
As a separate issue, the government of Croatia has so far declined to adopt an official poverty line—
on the grounds, it appears, that in present circumstances it can make no commitment to ensure that
no one will be forced to survive in poverty.  This means that all estimates of the scale of poverty in
Croatia—and hence on the need for particular forms of social assistance—are unofficial.  The
government  does, however specify a so-called subsistence minimum (which is thought to be
significantly below a reasonable poverty line) and this plays an important role in the determination
of levels of social assistance.
Despite the scale and complexity of the social problems facing the government of Croatia, the
evidence suggests that its economic policies have been reasonably successful.  Between 1990 and
1993 real gross domestic product fell by some 27 percent;  since then, growth has resumed.  In 1997
the rate of growth was as high as 4.5 percent;  output is now some 80 percent of its level in 1990.2
Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that even industrial output has begun to increase.
Also, after suffering from very high inflation in the early 1990s, the government introduced a
successful stabilisation programme.   As a result, in the last two or three years inflation has remained
low;  in 1997, the retail price index increased by as little as 3.6 percent.3  Further, in 1997 the budget
deficit was only 1.6 percent of GDP, much lower than expected.
There are, however,  some worrying aspects of the economy’s recent performance—chief among
them is the balance of payments deficit. Second, as we shall report in greater detail below,
unemployment remains high—although not as high as suggested by official statistics.  According to
the Labour Force Survey it was approximately 10 percent in 1997.  Finally, the share of the second
economy appears to be very large.  A recent study undertaken by the Institute of Public Finance,
estimated that  “…the unofficial economy in the Republic of Croatia was probably at least 25
percent of GDP in 1995.”4  Such a large “second economy” erodes the tax base and makes it more
difficult  to undertake the social welfare programmes to which the government is committed.
The rest of this report is organised as follows.  In section 2 we provide estimates of the level and
composition of social expenditure in Croatia in the last two or three years.  These show that the scale
                                                
2   Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation  World Bank, Washington DC, 1997;  p. 110.  Croatian Economic Monitor
PlanEcon Report No. 7-8, 1998;  p. 3.
3 There was, however, a sharp spike in the RPI in January 1998 when the new VAT was introduced.  Croatian
Economic Monitor  PlanEcon Report No. 7-8, 1998;  p. 3.
4 Ivo Bičanić & Katarina Ott  The Unofficial Economy in Croatia: Ccauses, Size and Consequences
Occasional Paper No. 3  Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb, 1997;  p. 1.
6of public expenditure has been growing and that it is high compared with a number of other
transition economies.  This is also true of social expenditure within the overall budget.  It is this
development that has, in fact, prompted the present report.  Section 3 focuses upon the labour
market.  It assesses evidence on participation and on the level of unemployment.  It also examines
evidence on inequality and poverty.  Finally, it looks at the unemployment benefit to see how far it
provides an adequate safety-net for those who lose their jobs.  Section 4 concentrates on the
structure of social welfare and social assistance programmes provided by the Croatian  government
and finally, Section 5 examines possible ways in which the efficacy of the present system might be
improved.
2. Social Expenditure and the Fiscal Burden
It appears that both the level of public expenditure as a share of GDP and the proportion of public
expenditure devoted to broadly social policy objectives in Croatia is high—and has been rising in the
past two or three years.  These trends, if continued, threaten to undermine the reconstruction and
development strategy adopted by the government (and described, inter alia, in the World Bank’s
CEM  Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation5)  In this section the evidence demonstrating the existence of
these adverse trends in public expenditure is presented.  The sources of public revenue are also
analysed.  This material provides a framework for the analysis of employment, unemployment and
social assistance in Sections 3 and 4.
Public expenditure in Croatia is undertaken by the national government and by local authorities at
County (Županija), city and municipal levels—and recorded in the budgets of these organisations.  It
is also undertaken by public authorities like the Pension and Health  Fund.  These organisations are
“off-budget”  in the sense that neither their revenues nor their expenditures form part of the national
government’s budget.  They are not, however, independent or autonomous;  the government accepts
responsibility for making good any shortfall in funding that might occur.  We believe that it would
be helpful both for planning and for accountability if the Ministry of Finance (or the Statistical
Office) prepared information about the level and composition of expenditure for the general
government broadly defined on a consolidated basis.
Meanwhile, in Table 16 we present information on  volume of public expenditure (in an
unconsolidated form) from the various institutions and levels of government for the years 1995-
1998.  The figures show that public expenditure in this sense amounted to some 50.8 billion kunas in
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71995;  this was equal to almost 56 percent of GDP.  By 1997, public expenditure had increased to 68
billion kunas—or almost 62 percent of GDP.
Further analysis of the figures suggests that although the national government was responsible for
public expenditure amounting to some 30 percent of GDP in 1995, it has not presided over a major
expansion in the last two or three years:  in 1997, the expenditure out of the national budget
amounted to little more than 31 percent of GDP.  Over the same period, expenditure by extra-
budgetary funds has increased from 19 percent of GDP to as much as 23.2 percent (and expenditure
out of county, city and municipal budgets has increased from 4.7 percent  to as much as 7.3 percent
of GDP.)
As the figures in Table 1 show, the largest of the funds is the Pension Fund;  it is responsible for
approximately half of all public expenditure out of extra-budgetary sources.  Its dominance has
tended to increase over the last two or three years since it has also grown rapidly.7  This growth
underlines the importance of the proposed reform of the pension system. Expenditure out of each of
these Funds increased by more than sixty percent in nominal terms between 1995 and 1997.
In Tables 2 and 3 we present estimates of the composition of social expenditure—but only out of
central and local government  budgets.  Expenditures by various extra-budgetary funds are ignored.
The figures in Table 2 repeat the story told in Table 1:  over the years covered by the table,
expenditure on social policy areas (health-care, education and social welfare) increased 7.3 billion
kunas to 11.9 billion kunas.  Expenditure on housing and communal services also increased sharply
in nominal terms—from 2.3 billion to almost 4.5 billion kunas.  This increase meant that the share of
social expenditure in the budget increased from 22.3 percent to as much as 28.1 percent.  The share
of total budgetary expenditure on housing also increased sharply between 1995 and 1996;  but it fell
slightly between 1996 and 1997.
As the figures in Table 3 show, in 1997, the national government was responsible for more than four
fifths of total public expenditure;  the bulk of the rest was undertaken by city and municipal
authorities.  Second, social policy-related expenditure accounted for almost a third of the total
expenditure of the national government;  it was much less important at sub-national levels. Cities
were responsible for the bulk of expenditure on housing and communal services;  they were also
                                                
7 As part of its stabilisation programme, the government of Croatia modified the procedure by which pensions
were indexed to earnings and the cost of living. As a result, the replacement ratio fell after 1994. This caused
pensioner groups to turn to the courts in an attempt to force the government to restore the previous link to
earnings. In May 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour.  This decision means that levels of
expenditure on pensions—and hence their share in total public expenditure—is likely to increase further.  This
increase could be substantial since the court suggested that compensation should be back-dated to 1994.
8responsible for a significant proportion of expenditure on education.  The national government, on
the other hand, was responsible for most expenditure linked to social security and welfare.  This is
one of two areas upon which this Report focuses.
Table 4 brings out another feature of Croatia’s public finances:  its very heavy reliance on payroll
deductions to finance social programmes—and general government activity more generally.  In
1997, direct taxes provided some 48 percent of central government’s tax revenues.  Of this total,
payroll deductions (taxes and contributions) accounted for more than 37 percent, while personal
income tax accounted for less than seven percent.  Corporate income tax accounted for even less:
only just over three percent.  Indirect taxes on domestic activities—primarily the sales tax—
accounted for a little more than two fifths of the total.
In 1998, as already mentioned, the sales tax has been replaced by VAT.  The changeover has been
surprisingly successful—in the first quarter at least—and collections are substantially above
prediction.8  It has been suggested that some part of the payroll deductions might be abolished—and
the cost of the services they pay for be transferred to the general budget.  It might be worth going
further and substituting the personal income tax (or, possibly, the personal and the corporate income
tax) for deductions from the wage fund.  Such a change would have two possible advantages:  it
would reduce the indirect costs of labour and thus might encourage entrepreneurs to employ more
labour.  It would also make it more likely that such employment would be in the first rather than the
second economy.  Second, it would mean that the burden of paying for social services would be
spread more equitably, since the personal income tax falls on all income, rather than just on wages.9
Income tax is also at least mildly progressive whereas payroll deductions are proportional at best.
The high and rising levels of social expenditure in Croatia, it has been claimed, are a consequence of
the large numbers of persons dependent upon state assistance.  These include pensioners, the
unemployed and, more generally, the inactive.  Containment of the rising volume of cash transfers
depends upon improvements in the labour market.  This topic is taken up in the next section.
3. The Labour Market:  employment, unemployment and earnings
 
 Employment and unemployment
 
                                                
8   For reasons that are not wholly  clear, it appears that the new VAT has succeeded in capturing some of the
transactions that were previously in the hidden economy.
9 Almost uniquely, the Croatian income tax is in fact an expenditure tax since interest on savings is tax free.
9The labour market plays a crucial role in determining the living standards of individual Croatians—
and hence the nature and extent of demands faced by social policy institutions.  A flexible labour
market, together with a growing economy, can ensure high rates of employment and rising wages.
This will reduce the strain on the social assistance system;  it will reduce the numbers seeking to
retire early and so on.  An inflexible labour market and restrictions on the mobility of labour will
accentuate problems of poverty and social exclusion and thus add to the burden of social care
associated with recession.  It will also make it harder to restructure the economy.  This section
examines the performance of the labour market in Croatia; in particular, we consider participation
rates and the level of unemployment.  We also discuss the main objectives of national employment
policy.  Second, we examine available evidence on recent changes in the cost of living and the scale
of poverty, on the evolution of real wages and the levels of unemployment benefit. This analysis
complements the review of social assistance and social welfare programmes contained in the next
section.
There are two sources of statistical information about employment and unemployment in Croatia.
There are statistics produced as a by-product of the administrative activities of the Employment
Service.   Second, in 1996 and 1997, the State Statistical Service also undertook a labour force
survey (LFS).  This was carried out, it is claimed “…in compliance with methodological rules and
guidelines of the ILO…and the European Statistical Office (Eurostat) which [ensures]
methodological comparability [with] surveys in EU countries.”10  For most purposes, LFS data is
more reliable than that produced by the Employment Service.11
Table 5 provides an overview of the state of the labour market in Croatia in 1996-97—or, at least, in
those areas covered by the labour force survey.  It reports a population of 3.7 million in 1996.  This
is some 742,000 less than the estimate reported in Croatia: Beyond Stabilisation which supposedly
covers the whole territory of the country. It also suggests that persons under the age of fifteen years
made up some 18.8 percent of the total population whereas Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation  suggests
a slightly higher proportion—19.6 percent.  Finally, the LFS suggests that males make up  some 47.8
percent  of the total population while the alternative source suggests a higher figure of 48.4
percent.12
                                                
10 Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske,  12. 2. 1998;  p. 14.
11 The Surveys were carried out in November 1996 and June 1997.  That in 1997 involved interviews with
10,434 households (26,368 individuals).  The sample was stratified, two-stage and randomly chosen.  But the
sampling frame excluded those areas which were liberated in 1995 or were still occupied in 1996.
12 Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation  World Bank, Washington, DC, 1997;  p. 104.  These differences are probably
too large to be explained by sampling variance;  more likely, the demographic structure of the excluded areas
differs from that of the rest of the country.
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Unusually, the LFS treats the population of working age as those over the age of fifteen year,
because a significant number of the employed are over the age of 65 years.  Table 5 shows that,
using these definitions, approximately 56 percent  of the population of working age was
economically active in 1996;  in 1997, this proportion had fallen to 54.6 percent.  Not surprisingly,
activity rates were higher among males than females;  but, worryingly, these rates fell for both sexes
between 1996 and 1997.
Age- and sex-specific  activity rates are reported in Table 6.  These show that participation rates are
much higher then employment rates for both sexes among those under the age of 25.  This is partly a
reflection of continuing education and partly of relatively high rates of youth unemployment.
Second, the table shows that some sixteen percent of men and almost ten percent of women between
the ages of  65 and 85 remain in employment. On the other hand, the table also reports almost a half
of men aged between 50 and 65 years were no longer economically active.  Almost three quarters of
women in the same age group had ceased to work or to look for work as well. These figures are
consistent with a situation where a significant proportion of the labour force in the relevant age
group has taken early retirement.  This is in addition to the fact that the official retirement age in
Croatia (sixty for men and fifty-five for women) is low by the standards of market economies—
although not out of line with the position in other transition economies.  This pattern of early
retirement must raise dependency ratios and put additional strain on the pension system.
Table 7 reports estimates of age-and sex-specific unemployment rates for 1997 derived from the
Labour Force Survey.  These show that, in that year, the unemployment rate among men was 9.5
percent.  Among women it was somewhat higher - 10.4 percent.  Combining these two figures yields
an estimate of the unemployment rate of 9.9 percent.  This is marginally lower than the rate in 1996
which was 10 percent.  Both these figures differ from the estimate derived from registration data—
15.7 percent in 1996 and 16.5 percent  in 1997.  Furthermore, not only are the estimates based on
administrative sources more than fifty percent higher than those from the LFS, the two sources imply
divergent trends.  The problem is that the unemployment register is contaminated by the fact that it
contains many individuals who are required to register if they wish to be covered by government
health insurance, but who are not actively seeking work—or are not available for work.13 They
should not, therefore be classified as unemployed;  they are, rather, economically inactive.
The figures in Table 7 also show that almost 30 percent of males between the ages of 15 and 25
years and more than a quarter of females in the same age group are unemployed.  These
unemployment rates are between three and four times as high as those among the population of
                                                
13 National Employment Policy  Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb,  February, 1998;  p. 13.
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prime working age;  they are more than six times as high as those among whom early retirement is a
practical alternative.  Youth unemployment is a serious problem and it is important that policies are
devised to encourage young people to seek employment—and employers to offer them jobs.  But it is
important to put the problem in its proper perspective.  As the second panel of Table 7 shows,
despite the very much higher unemployment rates, young people only made up slightly over a third
of the pool of the unemployed.  54.3 percent of the unemployed—more than half—were between the
ages of 25 and 50 years old.  Policies to reduce the level of unemployment should not be focused too
narrowly upon the problem of youth unemployment.14
Table 8 reports on the duration of unemployment in Croatia—as revealed by the LFS.  It shows that
more than two fifths of those classified as unemployed have been out of work for at least a year—
and that more than a quarter have been out of work for two years.  Second, the Table shows that
almost a third of unemployed women have been out of work for more than two years as compared
with little more than a fifth of  unemployed men.  As a result, women make up 55 percent of the
long-term unemployed although they only account for 48 percent of total unemployment.
Official figures suggest that there has been a steady decline in employment since the early 1990s.  In
1990 total employment was reported as 1.6 million;  in 1996 it had fallen to as little as 1.2 million.15
There is no reason to believe that this trend has been reversed in the last two years.  The level of
employment reported from these sources is significantly less than that derived from the Labour
Force Survey, but there is no reason to reject the claim that employment has fallen.16  It has worrying
implications.  First,  high levels of employment are the best way to ensure a satisfactory standard of
living for the mass of the population, so recent developments suggest that an increasing proportion
of the population may find itself under threat.  Second, since it is from the earnings of those
employed that the authorities acquire the resources they use to provide social assistance, a decline
implies that either less will be available—or that the burden on the employed will increase.  It is,
therefore of some importance to reverse this trend and this is a primary objective of national
employment policy.
                                                
14 Another thing to note about the figures in Table 7 is that although the unemployment rate among women is
slightly higher than that among men, the latter make up a larger proportion of the stock of unemployed persons.
This is an example of the difference between risk and incidence.  If policy is intended to reduce the prevalence
of a particular condition it should concentrate on those groups which account for the largest numbers of persons
who suffer from it—even if it is relatively uncommon.  On the other hand, if policy is intended to minimise the
cost of eliminating the condition, it should focus upon those groups at  greatest risk of suffering from the
condition.
15 Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation World Bank, Washington DC, p. 106.
16 See the analysis in Human Development Report:  Croatia  UNHDP, Zagreb, 1997;  pp. 16-18.
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The Croatian labour market is characterised by substantial unemployment and, it is suggested by
relatively low levels of utilisation of the labour that is employed.  This is confirmed by data on hours
of work reported in the Labour Force Survey.17  But, as we have already seen, there is a large
informal sector.  Transition has resulted in a significant shift of labour from the formal sector to jobs
in agriculture, trade, construction and services, often in the informal sector.  While some of this shift
has been desirable—in that it has been in response to the pattern of consumer demand—there is little
to suggest that it has resulted in improved average labour productivity in the economy as a whole.18
Furthermore, it has been claimed that jobs in the informal sector in general pay lower wages than in
the formal one19 and pay them more irregularly.  Finally, this shift narrows the fiscal base since
informal sector employers do not pay payroll taxes and contributions—or pay them at minimum
rates.
This analysis has led to the articulation of one objective of national employment policy:  the
legitimisation of the informal sector.  It is desirable that jobs (and, more generally economic activity)
currently located in the so-called hidden economy be brought back into the formal, regulated
economy—and thus become subject to taxation.  This implies a re-examination of the factors that
caused the shift to the informal sector in recent years.  It also implies a commitment to the creation
of more equal opportunities for the self-employed population (and those employed by them) to
enable them to make a better living from their work.20
Both the low level of job creation in the formal sector and the shift to the informal one have been
attributed  to the high indirect cost of employment—and, in particular, to the government’s heavy
reliance on payroll deductions.  The National Employment Policy  document  proposes various
changes with the aim of reducing the aggregate level of deductions from 44.2 percent  to 35.7
percent of a firm’s wage bill.21 We would like to point out, however,  that a deduction rate of 35-36
percent is still higher than the average for OECD countries and towards the upper end of the range
for transition economies as well.  We believe that a major effort should be made to reduce the
aggregate deduction rate further—say to 20-25 percent, the lower end of the range found among
OECD countries—even if this implies some reduction in the range or standard of social support
                                                
17  With the exception the self-employed who employ others (who reportedly work an average of 50 hours a
week)  men worked 42-43 hours a week in 1997;  women worked slightly less—in paid employment.  Unpaid
family members worked as little as 37 hours a week on average.  Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku
Republike Hrvatske  12. 2. 1998;  p. 12
18 National Employment Policy  Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, February, 1998;  p. 5.
19 Or rather, that those who have shifted to the informal sector often earn less than they had, previously in the
formal sector.
20  National Employment Policy  Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, February, 1998;  p. 5.
21   National Employment Policy  Government of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, February, 1998;  p.  11, 17.
In particular it is proposed to abolish both the child benefit and the Public Water Fund deductions and to reduce
pension and health insurance contributions.
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provided.  The adverse consequences of such a reduction would, of course, be less if formal sector
employment were increased.
The National Employment Policy document also stresses the desirability of undertaking a range of
active labour market policy measures.  It is suggested that that the labour force is underqualified—or
perhaps wrongly qualified—for the demands of a market economy.  This implies that effort should
be put into training and retraining.  Investment in human capital is desirable, but it is unlikely to
produce results quickly.  Moreover, it should probably concentrate on those under the age of 25
years.  It is also suggested that the labour force is insufficiently mobile and that more resources
should be committed to facilitating job-search (with the intention of increasing the number of
matches.)
The National Employment Policy document also suggests a change to the procedure by which the
right to health insurance, child and other welfare benefits are established.    At present, university
graduates, those released from prison or health-care institutions are required to register with the
employment service in order to qualify for health insurance cover whether or not they are actively
seeking or are available for work.  Similarly, beneficiaries must register with the employment service
in order to receive child allowances or certain other benefits even though many such persons are not
actively seeking work—and some may be disabled.  Such a procedure means that the so-called
unemployment register contains many individuals who are not unemployed in terms of ILO
definitions.  This distracts the attention of those who work in the employment service from what
should be their primary responsibility—the implementation of active and passive labour market
activities.  It also means that information derived from the register may be a misleading guide to
policy.
The document proposes that decisions over entitlement to health insurance should no longer be the
responsibility of the Croatian Employment Service.  More radically, it also suggests that the funding
of health insurance for particular categories of the population should be provided from sources other
than payroll deductions.22  If the proposals are adopted, registration with the employment service
will be motivated by a wish to work—and those registered will correspond more closely to the ILO
definition  of unemployment.  Furthermore,  the change will allow the staff of the employment
service to concentrate on the implementation of specifically labour market policies with an expected
improvement in the service’s effectiveness.
                                                
22  This would have the benefit that health insurance deduction rates could be reduced, making it easier to
reduce  indirect labour costs—and thus increase the likelihood that formal employment will increase.
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Earnings
 
If employment or the lack of it is one way in which the operation of the  labour market impinges on
the need for social assistance, then the other is in the level of wages that employment generates.  In
many countries, low (and irregular) pay is an important cause of poverty.  Here we examine three
issues connected with pay.  First we assess available estimates of the poverty line or the cost of
minimum subsistence.  (For non-Croatians, this is important as it gives an indication of what the
kuna is worth—and hence of the scale of the phenomenon of low pay.)  Second, we report some of
the available evidence about  the evolution  of real wages and wage inequality.  (In the absence of a
family budget survey or other information this is the nearest one can come to information about the
distribution of income.)  Finally,  we describe the unemployment benefit system and attempt to
assess how well it protects the unemployed.
Before turning to these issues, however, it is worth pointing out that there is very little statistical
information available on any of them. The government of Croatia has not published an official
poverty line.  In the absence of a family budget survey, it cannot determine the weights needed to
calculate a cost of living index—and does not in fact publish one.  Data on wages are largely
confined to the state sector;  earnings in the private sector are badly observed.  And, of course,
without a family budget survey there are no estimates of the level or composition of family
income—or of its distribution.  All of this should be borne in mind in assessing the analysis that
follows.
As  has already been mentioned, the government of Croatia has not chosen to calculate an official
poverty level.  Some conception of the official idea of the minimum cost of subsistence may be
derived, however, from the so-called subsistence minimum (SM)  the social assistance payable to
households without alternative means of support.    The way that this has evolved--in nominal terms-
-is reported in Table 9.  Until the end of 1997, the subsistence minimum only depended on family
size.  The implicit equivalence scale allowed 0.78 for the second member of a household, 0.67 for
the third member and so on.  In the new law on welfare a different principle was introduced:  the
amount allowed was made to depend upon age such that children between 15 and 18 years of age
received the same as the first adult, those under the age of 7 years of age received the same as the
second (and subsequent) adults—0.8  and  children between the ages of 7 and 15 years received 0.9
of the single person’s allowance.  As a result, in 1998,  the allowance paid for a family of four varies
between 1190 kuna and 1400 kunas per month depending upon its demographic composition.
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This sum is much less than the minimum cost of living, egzistencijalni minimum, (EM) for a 4-
member worker’s family calculated by the Croatian Council of Autonomous Trade Unions. In
March-April 1998 this was estimated to be 4818 kuna. The  EM is calculated according to what
appears to be an appropriate methodology.  A basket of consumers’ goods is priced each month in a
range of outlets in different parts of the country.  The results are used to calculate a minimum cost of
living for an (urban) family of four.  In April 1998 this was made up as follows:
Category                          Expenditure (kunas)       Weight in Index (%)
Foodstuffs 1920.41 39.8
Housing etc. 1311.85 27.2
Clothes and Footwear               643.78 13.4
Education and Culture     374.41   7.8
Transport   315.00   6.5
Hygiene                                         251.09                                         5.2
Total 4818.54 100.0
Without going too deeply into the content of the consumption basket underlying this index, the
above figures suggest that the standard aimed at is too high.   At subsistence--or, more properly, at
the poverty line in a country with a GDP similar to that of Croatia one would have expected food to
occupy more than 40 percent of total expenditure and housing (and transport) to take up less.  This
reservation is reinforced by the observation that the “basket” assumes that  the family possesses a
car, that it is purchasing a two-room apartment of 50 m2 with central heating and, less surprisingly,
that it possesses both television and a telephone. All of this suggests that the Union’s EM would
afford a standard of living somewhat above the austere.
In addition, the trade union index suggests that the cost of living is increasing much more rapidly
than the retail price index.  Indeed, it is clamed that the EM has increased by at least 22 percent in
the past six months at a time when the RPI is reported to have increased in 1997 by less than 4
percent.  Such a divergence is barely plausible and it suggests that there are shortcomings in the way
in which the index is calculated--despite the apparent soundness of the methodology.
A third approach to the calculation of a notional poverty line is to derive it from the distribution of
income--that is to postulate a relative poverty line at, say two thirds of median income.  This
approach is made difficult by the absence of data on the distribution of income.  In April 1998
median earnings were 2252 kunas a month;  assuming 1.7 employed persons per family implies a
median family income from employment of 3830 kunas and, allowing 20 percent for income from
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other sources a notional median family income of  4596 kunas a month.  Three fifths of this would
imply a poverty line for a family of four of  2760 kunas.  This is a little less than 60 percent of the
EM but almost double the MS.  Having established a series of benchmarks for the assessment of
poverty in Croatia, we now turn to an assessment of the evolution of earnings and inequality.
The evolution of nominal and real wages since the middle of 1995 is reported in Table 10. The
figures show a steady increase in both nominal and real wages.  Over the period covered by the
table, real wages increased by some 23.6 percent, or at some 9 percent a year.  This shows that
steady progress has been made in overcoming the consequences of war and transitional  recession—
even though there is still some way to go before the economy (and average wages) recover their pre-
war level.
Table 11 provides some information about changes in the distribution of earnings—or rather wages.
The distributions from which the measures of location and dispersion have been derived probably
refer to the same “enterprise sector” as those in Table 10.  They probably therefore under-represent
the private sector and hence the scale of inequality.  But taking them at face value, they suggest that
the sharp growth in inequality, so characteristic of transition economies has ceased—and has even
been reversed since 1993.23  Furthermore, some progress has been made in tackling the problem of
low pay.  Rutkowski reports that in 1993, some 19.7 percent of workers were earning less than two
thirds of the median wage.  According to the distribution underlying Table 11, in March 1998, only
15.5 percent of workers were in that situation.
The figures given in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that average real earnings have increased and that
inequality has fallen since 1995.  Taken together these suggest that poverty will not have
increased—at least among the employed population.  Since, according to the Labour Force Survey,
unemployment did not increase between 1996 and 1997 (indeed, it fell marginally) there is unlikely
to have been a sharp increase in the numbers in poverty on this account.  On the other hand, the
participation rate fell between 1996 and 1997 (by almost 2 percentage points.)  That is, the
proportion of the population that was inactive increased.  This may reflect increased affluence but it
is more likely to be a consequence of the so-called discouraged worker effect and, possibly some
part of the shift from formal to informal sector employment.  As such, certainly as concerns the first
of these components, it is consistent with some increase in poverty.  How far this is the case will
                                                
23  Rutkowski has described the growth in inequality of earnings during transition.  His figures indicate that, in
Croatia, the ratio of ninth to first deciles in 1987 was 2.59;  by 1993, this had increased to 4.36.  So far as I can
tell, he was using the same series on wages as are used in Table 11.  Yet,   as the figures in Table 11 indicate,
the decile ratio had fallen to 2.6 in 1996.  See Jan Rutkowski Changes in Wage Structure During Economic
Transition in Central and Eastern Europe  World Bank Technical Paper No. 340 (Social Challenges of
Transition Series)  Washington, DC, 1996.
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depend on the extent to which unemployment benefit constitutes a safety net which protects those
who have withdrawn from the work.
The rights of unemployed persons are set out in the Employment Act of 1996.  This states that
workers who are discharged are entitled to retain their health and disability insurance, to preserve
their pension rights and to continue to receive child benefits.  In addition, subject to certain
conditions they are entitled to receive unemployment compensation.  They may also benefit from
active employment policy measures undertaken by the Employment Service.
The Employment Act states that unemployed persons are entitled to receive compensation if they
have worked continuously for the past nine months—or for at least twelve out of the previous
eighteen months.  Depending on how long they have worked, unemployed persons may receive
benefit for between 78 and 312 days.  (Before the new act was introduced, the benefit period was as
long as 468 days.)  The amount of benefit depends upon wage or salary received for full-time work
in the three months preceding the onset of unemployment.  For the first 78 days benefit is paid at a
rate equal to 80 percent of previous wage or salary;  for the rest of the period, it is set at sixty
percent.24  Notwithstanding the above formula, unemployment  compensation cannot be less than 20
percent of the average wage for the economy as a whole (as determined by the latest published
figures.)  Nor can it exceed a figure determined from time to time by the Minister of Labour and
Social Welfare in agreement with the minister of Finance.
Women with a child under one year old who lose their jobs continue to receive unemployment
benefit until the child’s first birthday—irrespective of the formula given above.  Women with twins
or with three or more children—at least one of which is under the age of three years—will also
receive compensation until the child’s third birthday.
According the Article 19 of the Employment Law, workers are not entitled to receive benefit in the
following circumstances:  if they left work of their own accord;  if they failed to achieve the required
standard of performance during a period of probation or if they lost their job after having failed to
pass a professional examination;  if they failed to qualify after an apprenticeship;  if they were
dismissed for a breach of labour discipline.  Workers are also not entitled to unemployment
compensation if they are dismissed for absenteeism—for being absent for five or more consecutive
days without adequate reason.  Finally, they are not entitled to receive unemployment benefit if they
are dismissed as a result of receiving a prison sentence of more than six months duration.  Workers
                                                
24 Before the new law was adopted, unemployment compensation was equal to 50 percent of the worker’s
average salary for the three months preceding the loss of a job.
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who are disabled (as a result of an industrial injury or occupational disease) are not entitled to
unemployment benefit;  nor are those who retire—or meet the conditions for retirement.
Unemployment benefit will be withdrawn if a worker reaches retirement age and fulfils the
requirements for  the receipt of an old-age pension.  It will also be withdrawn if the beneficiary fails
to visit the Employment Agency when requested to do so;  if he or she refuses to accept the first job
offered that is appropriate to his professional skill or qualifications.
In January 1997, the lowest unemployment benefit payable was 415 kunas;  by September this had
risen to 479.2 kunas.  For the whole of 1997, the highest level of benefit was set at 900 kunas. These
sums are higher than the SM for a single person but less than the  relative poverty line (2760 kunas
for a family of four) and much less than the EM proposed by the Trade Union.  It is generally
believed that they are insufficient to keep recipients out of poverty—particularly if they have
dependants.25
Table 12 provides a little more information about the operation of the unemployment benefit
programme.  The first thing to note, however, is that registered unemployment in 1996 and 1997 is
substantially larger than that estimated from the labour force survey—for 1997, a monthly average of
277,000 as compared with 175,000.  Second, in all three years only a small proportion of those
registered are receiving benefit.  In 1995 it was less than 15 percent;  in 1997 it was almost a fifth.
Third, the average monthly value of the benefit was 618 kunas in 1995 or, approximately one third
of the average wage.  In 1997 the average benefit had increased to 733 kunas;  this was equal to
some 31 percent of the average wage. Although in absolute value the unemployment compensation
seems rather parsimonious, the implied replacement ratios do not seem to be substantially out of line
with those encountered in other industrial economies.  If unemployment benefit were much higher, it
might begin to constitute a disincentive to active search—and hence reinforce whatever tendencies
exist for the creation of an unemployment trap.
The analysis of this section has shown that there is a significant (and growing) inactive population a
significant proportion of which is dependent on the state.  It has also shown, however, that official
unemployment figures are exaggerated. On the other hand, unemployment is a particularly acute
problem among those between the ages of 15 and 25, between a quarter and a third of whom are
without work.  Long term unemployment is also substantial among women.  In the past three years
or so, average wages have increased and inequality has fallen—or, at least has not increased.  The
                                                
25  For more detail on this scheme see P. Bejaković  Welfare Policy and Social Transfers in the Republic of
Croatia  (mimeo) Zagreb, April 1998;  pp. 18-23.
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proportion of the labour force on low pay has fallen.  These trends suggest that the problem of
poverty has not increased among the employed population. But it may be extensive—particularly
among those whose connection with the labour market is tenuous or non-existent.  Just how the
welfare system deals with this group and with other social problems is discussed in the next section.
4. Social Welfare and Social Assistance
 
The social welfare and social assistance programmes provided by   the government of Croatia are in
process of evolution.  At independence, Croatia possessed a system of social security and social
assistance that was substantially socialist;   it was similar to those found in many other transition
economies.  It provided social protection through subsidies for basic wage goods;  as we have seen,
it promised a relatively young age of retirement;  and it offered cash transfers to assist with such
unexpected outlays as funerals and a layette for a baby.  In the last five to seven years, however, this
system has been progressively modified, both in response to financial stringency and to make the
system more consistent with a market economy.  The most recent step in this process has been the
adoption of a new Law on Social Welfare which came into effect in January 1998.  This law has re-
organised (and somewhat simplified) the cash transfers offered by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare (MLSW).  It has also simplified the forms of in-kind assistance provided by the state.  But
the introduction of the new law implies that virtually all the material about the operation of the
system that we have obtained is obsolete:  it refers to cash transfers or in-kind benefits that no longer
exist.  Furthermore there is no information yet available about the cost of various components of the
new system;  at best we know something about the number of beneficiaries.
This fact has affected the structure of this section.  It is organised as follows:  it begins with a brief
review of the old system—indicating the range of transfers and in-kind benefits that used to be
provided, how much they cost and how many beneficiaries were helped by each.  Second, the new
benefits and allowances provided by the Law on Social Welfare are described—as are those that
appear to continue from the old system.  Third, the system of child benefits is described, although
this is under threat of substantial reform.  The section ends with an assessment of the system as it
presently exists.
A review of the old system
 
The Social Welfare system as it operated in Croatia between, say 1994 and the end of 1997
provided for both cash transfers and in-kind benefits.  According to the statistics maintained by the
MLSW there were some twelve different cash transfers and at least six types of in-kind assistance
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provided.  In addition, some non-governmental organisations provided help for particular categories
of needy families—refugees, displaced persons, the elderly and indigent and so on.  In order to keep
track of who was receiving what, the Ministry issued all beneficiaries with a so-called social card
which on the one hand affirmed an individual or family’s right to benefit and on the other was
supposed to record all the forms of assistance which a particular family received.  According to the
MLSW, in March 1997 there were some 98.8 thousand social cards in circulation covering some
219.9 thousand individuals—members of families.  As Table 14 below indicates, for 1997 as a
whole there were some 336,000 beneficiaries of the system so it is possible that there was some
duplication of pay-outs.  The whole system of cards has now been abolished.
Tables 13 and 14 provide a basic overview of the Croatian social welfare system.  It consists of three
components:  cash transfers, benefits in kind and a range of residential and foster-care programmes.
The latter absorbed some seventy percent of total expenditure in 1997—although they assisted only
14 thousand individuals—less than five percent of all beneficiaries.  They are thus expensive—
particularly residential care.  It has been argued that fostering offers certain benefits over residential
homes run by the state, particularly for children.  We believe that these programmes would benefit
from a more extensive (and more specialised) assessment than we were able to give them.  Their
economic costs should be assessed in conjunction with their social and psychological effects on
those cared for;  and alternatives to residential care should also be assessed.
Turning to the other two components of the welfare system:  cash transfers are provided on a much
larger scale than in-kind benefits although there are a relatively large number of recipients of the
latter.  In fact, this is misleading;  by far the largest in-kind programme involves assistance in paying
for public and communal services.  This is classified as an “in-kind” benefit because the local
welfare office pays the bills of those who receive help of this type directly.  Hence it does not
formally constitute a cash transfer.   This approach probably reduces the temptation to spend such
assistance on inappropriate commodities or services.  But it reflects a relatively high degree of
paternalism.  It also makes it more difficult  for recipient families to budget in a way that reflects
their preferences.  While they may be a case for making the cash payment payable to the wife rather
than the husband, on balance this assistance should be transformed into a cash payment.  The same is
probably also true of distribution of clothes and foodstuffs—except insofar as they constitute
emergency relief for displaced persons or refugees.
By far the greatest share of social assistance in Croatia in 1995-1997 took the form of cash transfers.
The largest of these—both in terms of resources paid out and number of beneficiaries was the so-
called subsidy for the social minimum.  This involved payments to indigent households to bring their
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net income up to the social minimum.  In 1997, the average payment per beneficiary under this
scheme was approximately 212 kunas a month.  It is interesting to note that the average payment
made under the Financial Assistance Programme (which was intended for those without other means
of support) was little higher—251 kunas per month.  Payments under other programmes also appear
to have been modest on the whole.  Since the determination of entitlement involved assessment by
social workers (who enjoyed a fair amount of discretion)  it was probably quite costly to administer.
It has proved quite difficult to identify continuities in the system of benefits between that which was
in operation before the end of 1997 and that which has been introduced under the new law. It
appears that both permanent and temporary financial assistance and, possibly, the subsidy for the
social minimum have been replaced by Assistance for Maintenance. Second, it is possible that the
so-called financial assistance for the payment of bills for public and communal services has been
replaced by the programme of assistance with accommodation costs.   Third, a number of
programmes continue, even though they are not mentioned explicitly in the new act.  These include
the Assistance for Work Training and Earning a Living, Assistance with Funeral Expenses and the
Right to Reduced Working Time by Parents looking after Seriously Handicapped Children.  It
appears, however, that the programme providing financial assistance towards the purchase of
layettes for single unemployed parents has been abolished.  So, apparently, has the programme of
financial assistance for the personal needs of beneficiaries.
The new benefits and allowances
 
The basic assistance programmes introduced by the new Law on Social Welfare are the so-called
Assistance for Maintenance,  the Assistance for Covering Accommodation Costs and the Non-
recurring Assistance.  The act also reformulates the conditions for receiving an Allowance for
Nursing and Home Care and makes provision for  a range of residential care programmes.
The Assistance for Maintenance is intended for both individuals and families who have no resources
and for those who have insufficient resources to reach the so-called subsistence minimum  (SM).
For most families, the scale of support is that described in Table 9.  But additional provision is made
for the disabled, for single and expectant mothers. (Article 16)   Families can expect to receive the
difference between their average income in the three months preceding that in which they make a
claim and that which they would be entitled to according to the scale laid down in Table 9.  In this
context, income refers to earnings from all sources except disability payments, allowances for
nursing and home care and assistance with accommodation costs.  Alimony payments due to other
persons are also subtracted from average income before entitlement is determined. Maintenance is
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not paid in respect of persons who are in the army, in prison or who have been in hospital for more
than two months  Before receiving assistance under the act, individuals are expected to realise major
assets that they may own.
Assistance for Covering Accommodation Costs in the state sector is payable to an individual or
family if their average income in the three months prior to the month in which a claim is made does
not exceed 150 percent of the scale laid down in Table 9 (or Article 16 of the Act.)  It is payable to
those in private sector accommodation where income does not exceed 200 percent of the scale.
Assistance is  not payable if individuals or families own or co-own a second home.  The amount
payable shall equal the rent of the property occupied but for tenants in state property it cannot
exceed one half of the scale figure given in Table 9.  For tenants in private sector accommodation  it
cannot exceed the SM allowance given in Table 9 (or Article 16.)
Non-recurring Assistance is payable to those who due to current circumstances (birth of a child,
death of a family member and so on)  are not able to satisfy basic living requirements or particular
needs.  The amount paid shall equal what is needed to satisfy the particular purpose for which it is
granted with the proviso that, if it exceeds three times the  SM  (presumably for an individual—350
kunas in 1998) the consent of the Ministry shall be obtained before a payment is made.
The act also makes provision for the distribution of in-kind assistance in the form of foodstuffs,
clothes and footwear and so on in terms similar to those in operation  in 1997 and earlier.  It also
provides for a variety of forms of institutional care.  In this regard it states that the MLSW shall not
provide such care to persons who can be assisted and looked after by family members, or if the care
can be provided in another way.
Most if not all of the benefits provided for by the new act involve an income test of some kind.
Applicants are required to provide social workers with information about all relevant forms of
income and to communicate any substantial change in circumstances within eight days.  Social
workers enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to approve the payment of various forms
of assistance.  But, once granted, payments can continue for up to one year—unless beneficiaries
inform the social work centre of changes in circumstances.  The relevant Centre for Social Welfare
is required  periodically and at least once a year, to review the existence of facts and circumstances
that were crucial for issuing the ruling about entitlement.  The act does not lay down procedures or
requirements for the verification of statements of resources.
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The system of child benefits
 
As has already been stated, in Croatia the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is not responsible
for the payment of Child Allowances.  Rather, these are funded by a special payroll deduction of 2.2
percent which is paid into an extra-budgetary fund.  Child benefits are payable to the families of
workers, pensioners and the unemployed, to the families of armed services personnel and those of
military and civilian invalids.  Recipients are entitled to support in respect of all children for whom
they are responsible and as long as the children are in full-time education.  The amount paid depends
upon per-capita income in the household and varies from 103 kunas to 189 kunas a month for two-
parent families and from 141 kunas to 276 kunas per month for single-parent families.  It is not clear
how the authorities determine the per-capita incomes of recipients;  or how frequently the amount
payable is adjusted.  In 1996, the amounts received by the Child Benefit Fund (and   basically used
to pay child allowances) amounted to 0.9 percent of GDP.
A new law on child benefits is in preparation.  One version of it envisages a considerable increase in
the amount of the allowance in order to improve living standards and to stimulate an increase in the
birth rate.  It has also been suggested that the principle of financing child benefit through a payroll
deduction be abandoned.  In most transition countries children are particularly vulnerable to
poverty26 so the principle of a child allowance is desirable.  It is also probably desirable to focus
upon children in poorer families.  But the experience of many countries shows that such child
allowances are ineffective at raising birth rates and any hope that they will do so in Croatia should
be abandoned.  They should be seen first and foremost as an anti-poverty measure and not as an
instrument of pro-natalist policy.  Finally, if they are to serve as an anti-poverty measure, the British
experience suggests that they should be made payable explicitly to the mother and not to the
family—or the father.  In this way they are more likely to be used to improve children’s welfare.
An assessment of the presently system
The basic structure of social assistance—as set out in of the three main forms of cash transfer
contained in the new Law on Social Welfare (together with the provisions nursing and home care
allowances)—provides a system that is both relatively simple and one that is comprehensive in that
it is able to respond to the range of demands likely to be placed upon it.  It incorporates some form
of income test and this should serve to focus resources upon those most in need.  In principle,
therefore, it provides an appropriate component  of the social safety net that is needed to make the
                                                
26   See for example, C. Grootaert and J Braithwaite  The Determinants of  Poverty in Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union  (mimeo) World Bank, Washington DC, 1998;  p. 62ff.
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transition to a market economy as smooth as possible.  It is complemented by two categorical
programmes, child allowances and unemployment compensation, which provide added protection
against two major causes of poverty.  (The other components—which help to insure the population
against the risks that are an inevitable consequence of life in such a system—are the pension system
which protects against penury in old age and  the system which pays for healthcare. Neither of these
forms part of the terms of reference of this report.)
The social assistance programmes introduced by the new Law on Social Welfare have  many
desirable features in theory.  But, given the available evidence, it is not possible to determine how
efficiently they operate.  It is only on the basis of a family budget survey — or a special-purpose
survey of the level and structure of household incomes—that it would be possible to assess both how
far social assistance is concentrated on households who are poor and how far such assistance helps
them to escape from poverty.  That is, for Croatia, the data needed to calculate both horizontal and
vertical efficiency are lacking.  Until they become available, a final judgement on the system must be
deferred.
There is one further comment to be made about the system of allowances introduced in the new Law
on Social Welfare and, in particular the Assistance for Maintenance programme.  As it is presently
structured, for families receiving assistance, any increase in earnings will result in an equal
reduction in benefit.  That is, such families face a 100 percent marginal tax rate on earnings over the
range covered by the scale in Table 9.  This certainly constitutes a disincentive to seek employment
(or, possibly, to seek it in the formal sector.)  It thus threatens to create a poverty trap.  It is possible,
however, that the SM and the scale based upon it is so low (as claimed by the Trade Unions and
many observers) that few people will be caught in it.  Nevertheless, it would be better to modify the
scheme so as to introduce a tapered withdrawal and thus reduce the implicit marginal tax rate.
 
5. Conclusion
 
There are three components to Croatia’s social welfare policy broadly understood.  These are the
pension system, the health-care and educational systems and, possibly the provision of social
housing.   Third,  there are programmes of social insurance and social assistance.  The pension
system is intended to allow individuals to redistribute income over the life cycle and thus to guard
against penury in old age—or as a result of disability.  The health-care and educational systems (and
public housing) provide access to goods and services whose supply is often characterised by market
failure and significant externalities.  They are intended to allow people to insure against both the risk
of ill-health and the financial consequences of coping with sickness.  Both the educational system
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and public or social housing contribute to social integration and compensates for failures in the
capital market.  Finally, social insurance and social assistance provide some protection against the
(often uninsurable) risks that attend life in a market economy.  On the one hand, they are an
expression of social solidarity but they are also intended to make markets more flexible and thus to
improve both the equity and efficiency of  the economy.
The social insurance and social assistance component of social welfare policy itself consists of three,
or possibly four, components.  There are cash transfers.  In Croatia, these include such programmes
as Assistance for Maintenance, pomoć za uzdržavanje, which is intended to alleviate poverty.  But
they also include unemployment compensation and child benefit which are designed to provide help
for individuals or families facing particular risks or encountering an additional burden.  Second,
there are benefits in kind;  so far as the Law on Social Welfare is concerned, these are neither
extensive nor substantial. Third,  social welfare policy includes a more or less extensive provision of
foster-care or residential care for vulnerable groups.  To this list, perhaps one should add what are
often known as personal social services—counselling and assistance in resolving difficulties
experienced by vulnerable individuals, families or whole social groups.  In this report, we have been
concerned primarily with the structure and performance of this third component of Croatia’s social
welfare policy.
This assessment should be set in the context of the recent macro-economic performance of the
republic and of the government’s objectives for the country’s reconstruction and further economic
development.  Although recent economic performance has, on the whole been satisfactory, Croatia
faces more demands than many former socialist states.  Both the demands of transition and of post-
war reconstruction call for an increase in the level of investment.  This, in turn, implies a need to
raise the domestic savings rate and, possibly to attract resources from abroad.  This objective
imposes limits on the type and scale of social programmes that can be adopted at the present time.  It
is desirable, if not essential to create “space” for the investment necessary for reconstruction and
further economic development.  It should not be “crowded out” by public (and public current)
expenditure.  Yet, as the figures given earlier in this report show, this appears to be what has
happened in recent years:  the public sector (already large compared to other transition economies at
a similar level of development) has increased further;  within the public sector, current spending on
social programmes—particularly pensions and health-care have also expanded absolutely and
relatively.  This report has sought to identify ways in which recent growth in social assistance
programmes can be contained—and possibly reversed and, second, to assess whether the efficiency
of welfare policy might be enhanced.
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It is possible to specify a second objective for social and economic policy in Croatia at the present
time that also affects the way in which the programmes discussed in this report.  In Croatia as in
almost all other countries a primary aim of policy must be to get people into work—or back into
work.  For most people most of the time, dependency on state assistance cannot provide a
satisfactory alternative to employment—either in terms psychological satisfaction or material well-
being.  We would add two further qualifications to this objective:  in Croatia, it is desirable,
wherever possible, that people are found (or find themselves) jobs in the formal sector.  Not only are
such jobs more secure, in general, they also offer more opportunities for training and the acquisition
of skills.  Further, they will increase the tax base and, in some measure allow a reduction in indirect
labour costs.  Second,  in Croatia as in many other transition economies, particular attention should
be paid to skills and qualifications, because  the labour force is under-skilled or, more properly,
inappropriately skilled for the activities that make up a modern industrial economy.  This means that
the investment upon which economic reconstruction and development depends should be understood
to include investment in human as well as physical capital.  The various elements of social welfare
policy should be assessed with these goals in mind.
Some of the implications for social policy have already been mentioned earlier in the report.  But we
will repeat them here.  First, if participation rates are to be raised, an effort should be made to reduce
the indirect costs of employment.  This almost certainly involves a reduction in the overall level of
payroll deductions.  On the one hand, it may be possible to finance some of the programmes
currently paid for out of payroll taxation from alternative revenue sources;  if not, it may be worth
considering reductions in the level of services provided.  In any case a determined effort should be
made to reduce deductions to some 20-25 percent—the lower end of the range found in OECD
countries.
A reduction in the indirect costs of labour should make job-creation more attractive for employers in
the formal sector;  it may also persuade some currently operating in the grey economy to switch to
the formal sector.  After all, there are benefits as well as costs to entrepreneurs from operating in the
official economy.  The objective should be to tilt the balance somewhat more towards the formal
sector.  This has two further implications, neither of which is strictly concerned with social policy.
First, while payroll deductions are an important source of indirect labour costs, they are not the only
one.  It may be desirable to look at other sources of cost and to ask how far they might be reduced.
Also, one might extend this review to non-financial sources of labour-market inflexibility, since they
too add to cost and may discourage job-creation.  Second, more generally, since what is required is a
higher rate of job creation, one should be concerned with the buoyancy of the enterprise—and
particularly the private and small business sector.  If entrepreneurs are to be encouraged to expand
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and, in particular to  expand in the formal economy, it is desirable to create a business-friendly
environment.  In this context, it is desirable to re-examine regulatory regimes, procedural tax codes
and so on.
There is also scope for so-called  active labour-market policies.  At one end of the spectrum, these
include education and training. It could be argued that such training should concentrate on those
aged 15-24 years of age where unemployment  rates are highest (and, possibly, the payoff to
investment in human capital is greatest.)  But such policies should be monitored to ensure that they
are cost-effective;  that is, that the benefits exceed the costs—and that the return is higher than in
alternative uses of the resources.  Second, for the most part, training programmes should be demand-
led.
As we have already pointed out, the current Assistance for Maintenance, pomoć za uzdržavanje,
scheme involves very high implicit marginal rates of tax.  It therefore risks creating an
unemployment—and hence a poverty—trap.  It would be desirable, therefore, to modify the scheme
so as to taper the withdrawal of assistance and thus reduce the marginal rate of taxation involved.
More generally, if one wishes to tackle the problem of low pay, it might be worth considering to
introduction of assistance similar to the so-called working family’s credit provided by the United
Kingdom.  Such a scheme is intended to make work more attractive that dependence on state
benefits.  It is payable only to families on low income who are in work—and in Croatia one might
restrict that further to require potential beneficiaries to demonstrate that they are working in the
formal sector.
The other side of the coin of encouraging employment is that social assistance should be focused on
those least able to support themselves.  The benefit programmes contained in the law on Social
Welfare mainly incorporate an income test in addition to one or other categorical condition of
entitlement.  In principle this is desirable, particularly where resources are limited.  But there are
certain caveats that need to be borne in mind.  First, if income-testing is to be credible, it requires
some level of verification.  Such verification involves high administrative costs.  Second, it can lead
to substantial social exclusion—particularly among the low-paid.  More generally, as already
mentioned, income tests often create disincentive effects.  As a result, income-testing may be
counter-productive.
In the longer term, an alternative to income testing may be the provision of so-called categorical
benefits where entitlement to assistance depends upon the presence of an easily verified
characteristic which has been shown to correlate highly with poverty—for example unemployment
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or the presence of several children in the family.  But  such programmes depend upon statistical
analysis to identify the relevant factors or causes of poverty.  Such analysis cannot be undertaken for
Croatia until the Family Budget Survey or some other source of appropriate data becomes available.
As was observed earlier in this report the institutional framework within which social welfare policy
is implemented is quite fragmented.  We believe that  some improvement  in efficacy would follow
from a rationalisation of the system.  First, the so-called extra-budgetary funds should be brought
more explicitly within the public finance system.  (That is, they should lose their extra-budgetary
status.)  Second, we would suggest that the Child Benefit Fund disappear altogether and
responsibility for this programme be transferred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
Third, an attempt should be made to eliminate the duplication of forms of assistance.   For example,
the assistance for work training and earning a living should be transferred from the MLSW to the
employment service.  It should probably be phased out altogether—or merged with other training
and retraining programmes.  Further, there is a case for some re-organisation of provision for the
disabled.
Finally, we recommend that some effort be invested in improving the quality, range and frequency of
social statistics.  Such information is required for social planning, for the formulation of appropriate
policies.  One can go further, such information should also be made available to the research
community and, at least in part, it should be published.  These two steps will help to make
government at all levels more accountable to the electorate, by providing voters with more
information about the impact of government policies.  They should also raise the quality of public
debate and improve the quality of policy advice.
29
REFERENCES:
Bejaković, P. (1998): Welfare Policy and Social Transfers in the Republic of Croatia (mimeo)
Zagreb.
Bićanić, I. - Ott, K.(1997): The Unofficial Economy in Croatia: Causes, Size and Consequences,
Occasional Paper No. 3, Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb.
Državni zavod za statistiku (1998): Priopćenje Državnog zavoda za statistiku Republike Hrvatske,
Zagreb, 12. February  1998.
Državni zavod za statistiku (1998a): Statistical Yearbook 1998, Zagreb.
Government of the Republic of Croatia (1998): National Employment Policy, Zagreb.
Grootaert, C. -  Braithwaite, J. (1998): The Determinants of Poverty in Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union (mimeo) Washington DC : World Bank.
Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje (1996, 1997): Annual Report, Zagreb.
PlanEcon Report (1998): Croatian Economic Monitor, No. 7-8.
Rutkowski, J. (1996): Changes in Wage Structure During Economic Transition in Central and
Eastern Europe World Bank Technical Paper No. 340 (Social Challenges of Transition
Series) Washington, DC.
Rutkowski, M. (1996a): Labour Market Policies in Transition Economies, Moct-Most, vol 6,
no.1, p.19-26.
UNHDP (1997): Human Development Report: Croatia, Zagreb.
World Bank (1997): Croatia: Beyond Stabilisation, Washington DC.
30
Table 1
The Structure of Public Expenditure:  Croatia, 1995-1998
million kunas
1995 1996 1997 1998a
State Budget 32868 37463 42474 41200b
o/w National 28476 30973 34393 33363c
       Counties 534 797 860 na
       City/municipal 3858 5693 7219 na
Extra-budgetary funds 17977 21282 25522 27042
o/w Pension Fund 8860 10460 13759 14182
       Health Insurance Fund 7083 8357 8743 9622
       Employment Fund 446 676 714 764
       Child Benefit Fund 821 853 1004 1122
       Public Water Fund 766 935 1267 1334
Total Public Expenditure 50845 58745 67996 68241
GDP 94564 103610 109926d
Public Expenditure as percent of GDP 55.8 56.7 61.8
Sources: Estimates of the Ministry of Finance; Row (12)  Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation  World Bank, Washington DC,
1997, p. 111.
According to the Ministry of Finance estimate on official CBS data GDP was 107.255 mil. HRK in 1996, 122.904 mil.
HRK in 1997, and  135.645 in 1998. -  Monthly Statistical Review of the Ministry of Finance, No. 42, April 1999, Zagreb.
Notes:
a. entries refer to projected expenditures in the relevant budget.
b. estimated on the basis of the relationship between national and sub-national budgets in 1997.
 c. budgeted expenditure may differ from out-turn;  it appears to have done so in previous years.
 d  extrapolated.
Table 2
The Level of General State Social Expenditure:  Croatia, 1995-1997
                                                                                   million  kunas
1995 1996 1997
percent percent percent
Total 32868 100 37463 100 42474 100
o/w Social 7318 22.3 9213 24.6 11922 28.1
       Education 3916 11.9 4354 11.6 4896 11.5
       Health 119 0.4 215 0.5 250 0.6
 Social  Security &
Welfare
3283 10.0 4644 12.4 6776 16.0
Housing & Com.
Services
2300 7.0 4353 11.6 4473 10.5
Other 23250 70.7 23898 63.8 26079 61.4
Source:  Compiled from Ministry of Finance Data
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Table 3
Composition of General Social Expenditure:  Croatia, 1997
Total National County City
Total Expenditure (m. kunas) 42474 34395 860 7219
 (percent) 100.0 81.0 2.0 17.0
o/w Social 28.1 31.1 23.0 14.3
     Education 11.5 11.8 5.5 11.0
     Health 0.6 0.5 4.0 0.4
     Soc. Security 16.0 18.8 13.5 2.9
Housing & Com. Services 10.5 6.0 7.3 32.4
Other 61.8 62.9 69.7 53.3
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Finance Data
Table 4
Composition of Central Government Tax Revenue:  Croatia, 1997
           percent
Total Tax Revenue GDP
Total Tax Revenue 100 43.2
  Direct taxes 47.6 20.6
  o/w Payroll Deductions 37.4 16.2
         Personal Income Tax 6.8 2.9
         Corporate Income Tax 3.1 1.3
         Other 0.4 0.2
  Indirect Taxes 52.4 22.6
         Domestic 43.5 18.8
         Trade 8.9 3.8
Croatia:  Beyond Stabilisation,  World Bank, Washington, DC, 1997;  p. 88.
Table 5
Demographic Structure:  Croatia, 1996-1997
000
1996 1997
    Males      Females   Total       Males     Females        Total
Total Population 1794 1958 3752 1906 2079 3984
o/w -15yrs 366 344 710 383 369 751
     working age
(15+)*
1428 1614 3042 1523 1710 3233
  o/w active 927 784 1711 954 814 1768
        employed 838 702 1540 864 729 1593
        unemployed 88 82 170 91 84 175
   inactive 501 830 1331 568 896 1464
Source:   Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb 12 February 1998,  p.2
*  In the LFS, the population of working age is defined as from 15 to 85 years of age.
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Table 6
Age and Sex-Specific Participation Rates:  Croatia, 1997
Employmenta Participationb
                 Males            Females                Males                     Females
15-24 years 31.7 30.1 44.3 41.0
25-49 years 82.9 71.2 89.4 78.1
50-64 years 49.9 27.4 52.5 28.8
65-85 years 16.4 9.4 16.6 9.5
85+ years 7.1 2.0 7.1 2.0
Total 56.9 42.7 62.7 47.6
Source:   Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske  Zagreb 12 February 1998,  p. 3
Notes: a.  the employed population as a percent of the total population of a given age and sex.
            b.  the active population (employed + unemployed) as a percentage of the total population of given age and sex.
Table 7
The Structure of Unemployment:  Croatia, 1997
Unemployment  Rates Share of Unemployment
Males Females Total          Males        Females            Total
15-24 yrs 29.9 26.9 26.5 20.6 17.1 37.7
25-49 yrs 7.3 8.8 8.0 26.3 28.0 54.3
50-64 yrs 4.8 4.4 6.0 4.6 2.8 7.4
65-85 yrs (1.1) (1.1) 1.1 (0.5) (0.1) 0.6
Total 9.5 10.4 9.9 52.0 48.0 100
Source:   Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske  Zagreb 12 February 1998,  p.4
Table 8
Duration of Unemployment:  Croatia, 1997
000
     Males      Females          Total
up to 1 Month (and those who have found jobs) (12) (9) (21)
1-3 months (12) (10) 22
4-6 Months (10) (11) 20
7-12 Months 19 16 34
13-24 Months 18 14 33
25+ Months 20 25 45
Total 91 84 175
Source:   Priopćenje Državnog Zavoda za Statistiku Republike Hrvatske  Zagreb 12 February 1998,  p.11
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Table 9
Social Minimum:  Croatia, 1995-1998
kunas per month
January
 1995
January
 1996
January
 1997
January
 1998
Social Minimum Allowance
1-member household 234 243 315 350
2-member household 416 432 560 630-700a
3-member household 572 594 770 910-1050a
4-member household 702 729 945 1190-1400a
each additional member 78 81 105 280-350a
Source: Compiled from data supplied by the Croatian Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
a  In 1998 the principle on which the social minimum was calculated was changed.  From this date, the SM is set at 350
kuna per month for the first adult or for children between the ages of 15 and 18 years, 280 kuna for each additional adult
and for children under the age of 7 years and 315 kuna for children between the ages of 7 and 15 years. The ranges cited in
that table reflect minima associated with alternative possible  family compositions.
Table 10
The Evolution of Earnings:  Croatia, 1995-1998
Nominal Net Wage
(Enterprise Sector)
kunas
Real Net Wage
(Enterprise Sector)
1993=100
June 1995 1735 151.8
December 1995 1826 153.5
June 1996 2036 162.2
December 1996 2177 170.9
June 1997 2329 186.4
November 1997 2450 187.7
February 1998 2475 189.6
Sources:  Rows (1)-(6)  PlanEcon Report:  Croatian Economic Monitor, March 19, 1998;  p. 23.  Row (7) Source:   
Priopćenje Državnog zavoda za statistiku Republike Hrvatske,  Zagreb,  4. May 1998;  p. 2.
Table 11
The Distribution of Wagesa:  Croatia, 1996-1998
December
1996
December
1997
March
1998
Median wage (kunas) 1958.0 2305 2253
1st Decile (as percent of median) 57.6 57.0 59.6
1st Quartile 78.3 76.1 76.1
3rd  Quartile 131.6 130.9 127.8
9th Decile 152.2 164.7 150.0
d9/d1 2.6 2.9 2.5
Source:  calculated from figures supplied by the Institute of Finance.
a  The figures refer to the distribution of workers by net wages in both the productive, privreda, and the unproductive,
neprivreda, sectors.  In all probability the private sector is underrepresented.
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Table 12
Registered Unemployment and Unemployment Benefit:  Croatia, 1995-1997
1995 1996 1997
Registered Unemployment (monthly average) 255230 276290 277691
Beneficiaries (monthly average) 36183 52912 55171
Share (in percent) 14.2 19.2 19.9
Aggregate Expenditure on Benefit (m kunas) 268.5 427.0 545.6a
Average Monthly Benefit (kunas) 618.4 672.5 733.4b
Source: calculated from information supplied by the State Employment Service.
a Forecast level of expenditure;  for expenditure as a whole, the realised level was approximately 89 percent of the forecast.
b  adjusted for the fact that out-turn was less than forecast.  Without this adjustment, the average monthly benefit was
estimated at 824 kunas.
Table 13
Social Welfare and Social Assistance:  Croatia, 1995-1997
1995 1996 1997 1997
m. kunas percent
total of
 percent of
category
Cash Benefits (1.1-1.12) 203.8 220.0 278.6 29.8 100.0
1.1 Financial Assistance 28.9 31.9 40.9 14.7
1.3  Non-Recurring assistance 23.2 28.4 36.0 12.9
1.5  Allowance for Nursing and Home
Care
18.4 21.0 31.0 11.1
1.7  Subsidy for Social Minimum 110.0 109.1 136.7 49.0
1.10  Right to Reduced Working time
for parents of  Handicapped Children
14.6 20.3 22.8 8.2
Other 8.6 9.2 11.1 4.0
Assistance in Kind  (2.1-2.6) 54.7 35.3 41.6 4.4 100.0
2.2  Assistance with Heating Fuel 7.2 6.9 6.8 16.3
2.5  Free Schoolbooks a 24.5
2.6  Financial Assistance in paying for
Public and Communal Services
20.6 25.8 30.9 74.2
Other 2.4 2.6 4.0 9.6
Residential Care and Fostering 466.4 533.2 644.3 69.0 100.0
3.4  Fostering 19.9 36.9 53.4 8.3
5.6  Residential Care 424.5 468.1 509.1 79.0
7.8  Other 22.1 28.2 81.8 12.7
Total Expenditure 725.0 788.5 933.7 100.0
Sources: Compiled from data provided by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and the Institute of Public Finance.
a Since 1996, free schoolbooks for primary school pupils of socially threatened families have been provided by the Ministry
of Education and Sport.
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Table 14
Number of Beneficiaries of Welfare Programmes:  Croatia, 1995-1997
                                                                                                                       000
1995 1996 1997
Cash Benefits (1.1-1.12) 169.8 175.0 196.9
1.1  Financial Assistance 13.1 12.9 13.6
1.3  Non-Recurring Assistance 80.9 92.3 102.1
1.5  Allowance for Nursing and Home-care 13.3 14.8 17.4
1.7  Subsidy for Social Minimum 50.6 45.9 53.8
1.10  Right to Reduced Working Time for Parents of
Handicapped Children
1.4 1.6 2.1
Other 10.5 7.5 7.9
Assistance in Kind  (2.1-2.6) 235.5 141.4 124.6
2.2  Assistance with Heating 6.5 7.8 7.3
2.5  Free Schoolbooks 121.6
2.6  Financial Assistance in Paying for Public and
Communal Services
102.0 124.8 105.7
Residential Care and Fostering (3-8) 12.8 12.7 14.3
3.4  Fostering 2.7 3.1 3.6
5-6  Residential Care 9.7 9.4 10.4
Other 0.4 0.2 0.3
Total Number receiving Assistance     418.2     329.3     335.9
Source:  Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
